ESTATE OF T. J. MILLIKEN.
No. 6140--April 5, 1875.
JURISDICTION.--RESIDENCE AS A JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENT. MAY BE
ENQUIRED INTO BY DIRECT PROCEEDING AT ANY TIME FOR THE PURPOSE OF HEARING
APPLICATION TO REVOKE LETTERS. FACTS SHOWING PLACE OF RESIDENCE.
When application by petition has been made to this
Court for letters of administration, and notice of hearing given, and letters
issued, if at any subsequent time in the administration, it is made to appear
that the Court had no jurisdiction by reason of non-residence of decedent, the
Court will entertain a motion for discontinuance of proceedings. The fact of the giving of ten days' notice by
posting of hearing on petition for administration, does not bind the Court,
when a direct attack is made upon the jurisdictional right of the Court.
FACTS from which the place of residence may be
determined.
Construing
sections, Pol. C., 52; C. C. P., 1294.
N. G. Curtis, T. J. Clunie
and J. F. Finn, for the petitioner.
J. G. Eastman and J. M. Coghlan, for administrator.
Deceased died intestate in Sacramento, October 29,
1874. C. M. Stratton filed petition for
letters of administration, together with the written request of Katie P.
Milliken, who claimed to be the widow of the deceased. Notice of hearing was given by posting under
the statute. On the hearing no person
appeared except said Katie P. and the petitioner, and after hearing their
testimony, letters were granted to petitioner, the order reciting that it was
"proved by the oath of Katie P. Milliken that deceased was a resident of
the City and County of San Francisco," and letters were thereupon issued. Feb'y 10, 1875,
Emma H. Milliken, daughter of deceased by former marriage filed petition for
revocation of the letters to Stratton, upon the grounds that deceased was at
death a resident of Sacramento County, and that said Katie P. Milliken alias
Katie P. Pearson, upon whose request letters were issued to Stratton, was a
mulatto or negro, and that deceased was a white man, and that the marriage
between them was null and void. Upon
this petition an order to show cause was made and citation issued returnable
February 23, 1875.
On that day the parties appeared by their attorneys,
and Stratton demurred to the petition of Emma H. Milliken. Upon the argument of the demurrer the only
point presented was that two causes of action had been improperly joined in the
petition, and upon that ground, and not other, the demurrer was overruled. The administrator by leave then filed a
special demurrer, and also an answer. It
was agreed between counsel that, for the convenience of witnesses, proof should
be taken, and thereafter the whole case, including issues of law raised by the
demurrer and issues of law and fact raised by the answer, should be considered
and passed upon. Proofs were accordingly
taken, and the various questions of law and facts were discussed by counsel. Upon the argument four points were made, viz:
FIRST--By the respondent, Stratton, that this Court
having found, in the order appointing Stratton, that deceased was a resident of
this city and county, that finding cannot now be reviewed, and the question of
residence is settled so far as concerns this administration.
SECOND--By the petitioner, Emma H. Milliken, that the
deceased was at the time of his death a resident of Sacramento county, and therefore this Court has no jurisdiction.
THIRD--By the petitioner, Emma H. Milliken, that
Katie P. Milliken is a mulatto and the deceased was a white man, and that the
alleged marriage between them was void under Sec. 60, of the Civil Code, and
that she had no authority to either nominate an administrator or to have
letters to herself.
FOURTH--By the respondent, Stratton, that Sec. 60, of the Civil Code, is in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the U. S., and is void.
It was agreed between counsel for the respective
parties, that if this Court should be of opinion that the question of residence
could now be inquired into, and should find from the evidence that deceased was
a resident of Sacramento, the order proper to be made would be an order
discontinuing the proceedings in this Court and dismissing the same; and that
the question of validity of the marriage would not be for present decision; but
if this Court should retain the proceedings, the validity of the marriage and
the force and effect of Sec. 60, would be passed upon.
By the COURT: As to
the first point, that the question of residence cannot now be inquired into; I
have read all the cases cited by respondent; and I find them to be uniform that
the question of residence cannot be raised by collateral attack, that
is, by questioning, in another Court, the correctness of the finding of this
Court. But this proceeding is not a
collateral attack; it is a direct attack.
I am not referred to any case holding that a direct attack cannot be
made. In 28 Vermont, 667, cited by
respondent, it is held that the order of the Probate Court can be questioned only
by some direct proceeding; and in 14 Gratt., 236, it
is held that the order is voidable on citation or
appeal.
In the case at bar, the notice of hearing application
for letters was by ten days posting in this city and county, and the only
witness examined as to residence was Katie P. Milliken. If it were true that after such hearing the
question of residence could never again be raised, except by appeal, it would
of course result, that upon the death of any citizen of this city and county,
no matter how well known at home, any person could go to San Diego or any
distant county, petition for letters, give ten days notice by posting, make
oath that the deceased resided in that county, take his letters, and thereby
prevent the possibility of the subject being inquired into again in that
Court. This objection by respondent is
overruled.
SECOND---As to the place of residence of
deceased at the time of his death.
From 1853 deceased had been a resident of Sacramento city and county;
was a merchant, member of the firm of Milliken Bros.; the firm carried on quite
an extensive business, and had considerable property in that city; deceased
gave his personal attention and attendance to the business; he had a family,
consisting of a wife and several children, who with himself occupied the family
residence on 16th and H. streets. Prior
to October, 1873, he formed illicit relations with the petitioner, Kate P.,
also a resident of Sacramento, and in October, 1873, his wife obtained a
divorce from him. At some time prior to
the divorce he took rooms and board at the Golden Eagle Hotel in
Sacramento. He remained at that hotel
until April, 1874; portions of the time Katie P. was
at the hotel, with him, and he was occasionally away for a few days at a
time. In January, 1874, he was married
to Katie, and he took rooms in San Francisco which were occupied from that time
on by Katie, except when she made occasional visits to him at Sacramento, and
by himself when he made occasional visits to her in San Francisco. In April, 1874, he removed to the
International Hotel in Sacramento, and occupied rooms there until July 23,
1874, from which date until Aug. 13, 1874, he boarded at another hotel in
Sacramento. Aug. 13 he returned to the
International Hotel and occupied his rooms there thence until his death, Oct.
29, 1874. He had continued to make
occasional visits of a few days to Katie in San Francisco, and she visited him
in Sacramento. In August and September
he made a trip to the mountains for his health, and after his return he was
confined to his room by his last illness for about ten days. He was constant in his attendance at the
store of Milliken Bros. previous to his last illness, except when temporarily
absent from the city as above stated.
He had relatives, friends and business acquaintances
in Sacramento, none of whom, so far as appears, had any information of any
intended change of residence. He told
Katie and persons of whom they had rooms in San Francisco that he intended to
reside in that city, but it does not appear that he had carried that intention
into effect. Indeed, in my opinion those
declarations were made more to conciliate Katie, in regard to whom he labored
under much social criticism in Sacramento, and who found her residence there to
be unpleasant, than to indicate any real intention upon his part.
I find as facts that deceased was a resident of the
city and county of Sacramento from 1853 continuously until his death, and that
at the time of his death he was a resident of that city. It therefore follows that this Court has no
jurisdiction to continue the administration of his estate; and under the
agreement of counsel hereinbefore noted the proceedings for administration
should be discontinued.
Transcribed
by Sue Wood.
© 2007 Sue Wood.
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