ESTATE OF ELIZA HASKELL.
No. 8382--October, 1878.
RES ADJUDICATA.--GRANT OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.--WHAT IS ADJUDICATED BY THE ORDER.--HEIRS NOT
THEREBY PRECLUDED FROM SUBSEQUENT DENIAL
THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR IS NOT THE HUSBAND OF DECEDENT.
In granting letters, the only questions decided by the
Court are, whether there is property; whether the Court has jurisdiction; and
whether
the party
applying is competent.
When letters have been granted to a person, whether
claiming the grant as heir or creditor, the question of heirship
or of the validity of the
claim as
creditor, must be passed upon in an independent proceeding; there being no contest
to act as an estoppel.
Construing
section, C. C. P., 1365.
C. H. Parker, for Haskell,
administrator.
G. F. Sharp and J. C. McCeney, for Volena E. Harrigan.
J. M. Burnett, for R. D. Scofield.
Heretofore, Haskell, as husband of deceased, applied
for letters of administration, which were granted. After four months, R. D. Scofield
petitioned for partial distribution, claiming the whole estate as sole heir at
law, alleging himself to be the only child of deceased by a former marriage,
and that the marriage with Haskell was void.
Haskell answered the petition, alleging the grant of letters to him, and
claims that all parties are now estopped from
questioning his relationship; that the order of this Court granting letters to
him is an adjudication for all purposes that he was
the husband of deceased. Volena E. Harrigan demurred to
the answer, and argument was had on the demurrer.
By the COURT:
The object of the petition for and the grant of letters was to have an adjudication that the deceased had died, and
that she left estate subject to administration in this Court. The existence and allegation of these facts,
the requisite notice being given, gave the Court jurisdiction. The question as to who should be the
administrator is quite another matter.
The administrator is but an officer of the Court. The object of alleging that petitioner was
the husband, was for the purpose of showing that he
had a right to administer, over all others.
The Court could have granted letters to him even if the petition had not
alleged the relationship. The question
of relationship and the consequent right to succeed to a portion or the whole
of the estate was not then in issue, and would not arise for purposes of
succession until distribution be asked for.
By the notice which was given on application for letters, the attention
was not challenged as to who should succeed or had succeeded to the estate; it
was challenged only to the matter of having administration. Suppose a creditor should apply for and
obtain letters, would the grant be conclusive as to his debt, and he be under
no necessity of having it allowed before payment? By no means.
The demurrer is sustained.
Transcribed
by Sue Wood.
© 2007 Sue Wood.
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